

CUBA

Ifflandt:

1) Ifflandt info revealed to USG on Nov 5;

presented to US State, w/ height of crisis,

27 Oct (Saturday) (Endorse writing memo for  
President on Sat + Sunday). little action.

Also, UN attitude in view: "old tide can't

Also, UK-US coordination with cooperation over Berlin.

(Keyson away on Andes).

2) US <sup>Engulf</sup> informed Regime for Berlin lethal to come to

MSC on next following Cuban crisis.

Consider events leading up to Cuba as a failure of

"communication," listening, inference (SO minority of

US response; US minority of SI intuition, estimates,

action. Warning so successful, accurate, truly

inferred (+ prediction), and, failure of attempt to prevent.

(Does this warrant confidence in efficacy of com, offering lessons of failure to avert crisis or recognize it?)

revision of views, ... over, now

Saturday Aug 22, '65

History

[What was more likely to make attack?]

What makes them think so?

How surprising was blockade? UFE spent?

One month was the war? What  
blockade were been made to him?

[Off 81-2 shot down of U-2 was unauthorized — how  
much did it worry US?

If U-2 overflight was unauthorized, does not did it  
worry UFE? & ? ]

[Black-Box problem. Why did nations take the  
abnormal actions. Why did? Under what circumstances  
would they act the same — in different?]

Not enough data, experience  
borders, inner structure changes  
by, and look at the works?  
WHAT ARE SIGNIFICANT (surviving) OUTCOMES OF THE PREG?

[Did SO think that "the problem" was to get  
some assurance on island — or not, by playground  
"inspiration"?  
From Te Detention? English difference in SO over  
to Cuba, we move to Bahamas; why didn't letter create  
crisis? [What response set right we do?] ]

With SO that it refused to postpone  
detention by a few days or weeks — how they were  
then? What if they do it's our first  
boat should ready missiles? ]

Why would countries have made us willing to attack?  
How important in supporting our response was it  
feeling that Turkish missiles were rather intolerable  
to us, indefensible? ]

Mosque attacks in Derafsh: within listed to SEM: 2  
Ours, or down-voiced

[Were there false alarms in my left  
from intell. analysts, as well as refugees?]

Suggestion: report after mid-light:

- 1) Specific zone in Derafsh Air heavily guarded  
by Soviets, Cuban, Chinese
- 2) Oral reports by Castro side: we know RECH not  
noise?
- 3) " " " " : Some stories were from  
a) right of tank convoy with white painted like MEDEVAC

Early Sept. - activities on dinner, based on DCI instruction

that Bunker should be greatest possible photo obj.

Aug 31 - Sept. - activities on our side of 29 Aug flight.

Early Oct. - Oct 11 - activities on 31-28's

Oct 12: <sup>22</sup> special class system.

[From: "each analysis last year for mid-Sept; S. Feb 13 speech.]

[Dynamic pattern? Early stage of potential crisis]

→ tension; fear of incidents that could happen

→ tension: main parts of crisis (not yet believed)

(a) high) → contract on a) life-threatening

(b) norm, adjustments) → delayed recognition of problem  
increased import of conflict

and on ... a) alert, readiness

[What if PAF had been neutral,

→ increased alertness;

even threatend, prior to Oct 14!]

flexibility

consider options on PAF!

→ increased uncertainty

Both increase chance of a hot conflict

[Any way to hot conflict can  
should not be there affect? Have they?]

[Yet, if incident does occur, consider effect of first

as of now, 1) readiness

with 8<sup>o</sup>

26 Aug 30<sup>o</sup>

V-2 over China; U-2 over Pakistan

WHAT IF THESE HAPPENED PROB TO AUG 29?

(Would have been U-2's responsibility to take  
agents up into more directly a mission on conflict, e.g. Sept 20?)

[Photo coverage of Earth flights being discontinued  
it was - what later? [SAMS?]

[What would have been difference of our strategy to constraints  
on standard coverage?]

Sept 10: The initial objective to Carter flight plan otherwise  
missed a one flight contact control, because of  
initial 5 flights, lower

why no proposal to take against it next week?  
Assumption on speed of installation? [SAMS?]

[Also mission on 10th cancelled? Why?][SAMS?]

over SE  
Flight for 10th delayed then cancelled for weather. Even Piers

17 Sept: unusable photos 18-21: cancelled for weather.

No flight when weather good. 4 days before takeoff

Between Sept 5 - Oct 14, 3 cancelled missions cancelled

for bad weather, even temp; weather flew, but obscured

[Did TACOMA Committee fix this problem?]

Mission deleted to even worse from 22-26

Flight plan compiled Oct 7.

Flight will take total cost of operation?

Flight of 2.51 → Oct 8, report received from

many subjects of interest worth

Cost published?

[WS<sub>2</sub> are checked at  
instantly?]

Flight planned on Oct 9 to cover both

Oct 9. MC engaged for extensive overflight

[What did his opinion stand?] Special Group requested

study by NRC on all of alternative means of cover,

because of increased risk; meeting on Oct 9 to hear

report (see?) ; planned flight in bad weather on 10-13-37.

Why does C.R. allow certain areas of overflying international  
waters, but S.C. prohibits certain areas?]

Liberated weather on Oct 14-22 — 20 mission flown  
comparatively [MRC Oct 2-14?]

begin to Oct 25 Med, "Spicer, Carroll, Taylor,  
Ward, Bill, Johnson, Martin, Tolson, McC;  
Carter, Gandy. [P.T.O.]

[Johnson? Cooper, Conn?  
Embly? Brown? Who else was actually there?  
What did they do? Talk, write? Feel? First  
impressions? What they know or expect JFK to be like?  
O'Brien? Tris? Why till then but not JFK?  
How unusual was this?

Jackson?  
At first meeting, were following, Johnson, Nitze, South, then?  
What discussion, other than morning? Any? Response?  
[What can be inferred about responses if news had  
been different?]

[If photos had showed open, insides & alert, with  
weapons — instead in that night will have  
been silent in Johnson — would have been, without doubt!  
Gandy? How come?]

and ending with what was (and still is) follows:

Day of first negotiations (end) : that the U.S. in 1962

[should] have been treated as a "militarized" to be "armed"  
"nation"  
by Mexico as Mexico

[could we have? Was fast? Sure?]

[Did it fact that that sportational status of weapons  
would influence more that early discovery would make  
us more willing to act?]

Reformist (?) position (end): why not just a east  
orientation? (NOTE: this would suggest non-intervention  
now in Turkey if we wanted that! Any reaction?)

[One position on Cuba or double bank of keeping Cuba  
based on my prediction of this?]

[Little access to Oral history interview or tapes on Cuba]

Any strike of stick (what?) in section, 75.

Wards for 1863-4, another 100 sections for ~~reservoir~~  
100 for 1865. Reservoir about 200 sections, 9000 rods.

Then there is ground, "dry" & "soft." [what?]

Cannot form all of rods; a blockade  
of open <sup>mines</sup> mines

NE corner pasture could not be crossed.

Then off without Pre.

No or strike is dangerous to the country, to the town;

most points of striking without warning, particularly to

it lies on the inevitable (?) alarm circuit (or alarm committee)

[Any flight to desertation attack?] [dry?]

[See Appendix in 16 Oct.]

Electrode regarded as more volatile, provocative,  
then listed air strike against man in line. (O-2 1861)

[Does he that last now?] Palmer had called

G: Another "act of war" on Oct. 6. But and?

Attack, but not like incident? [I decided by himself?]

W: What's attack? I ready? J: Opposite first what  
would... We might not done it without some? [I?]

(I decided)  
Hedging, Hitler's own words

J had to blockade...

Mengler to S: "sinister type" of his country for

withdrawal of German question; important no progress on  
Berlin.

[Be touch on Berlin - as reported?]

G instructed to make it clear and to also was only  
for the purpose of contributing to the defensive capability  
of Germany. [not, defensive purpose?]

WFK: no threat of invasion to Cuba; until have been  
asked to give assurance to that effect if he had asked?

[So: guarantee now or now concern?]

G: Some specialists in Cuba were giving training in building  
certain kinds of defensive works. [They were spying]

NSCNS, SS MR J

Tolson: Did G know we knew? Eliot Debney did not  
know. J

Funding right both lines of action (Blockade + Hostile)

House, Senate, etc. (House? 1963?)

Simpson worked on paper for Pres.

W. Bush paper was used

Final draft of speech written by Johnson. (Pres.)

Late morning: Johnson receives interview (see) (Oval Office?)

Pres: 2:30 Everybody, including Truman, Simpson, Justice

Christie: large; most certainly must follow  
with invasion (?), Cuban situation connects

with invasion. (see) Pres would not respond

arbitrarily. NEK: plan presented was "not surgical,"

were "apt to provoke" (see?) require maximum committee

Johnson was "only course of action compatible with  
our principles. Only a small risk the world will fall the  
long road."

Evening: JFK talked to House later, to House floor  
(President: just 1 hr.)

To hangman bases, Central base of freedom

If continental continental, might be necessary to strike

with common bases, and try to make contacts, especially

with SIC state

idea

If necessary makes war made against U.S., it might  
be necessary to invade, but not to use force against them;  
however, it might be necessary to make a compromising  
threat to S.U.

Any planning? Analyze?

Sunday morning:

Till 10, who final approach to him, possibility  
we would agree with strike.

2:30 NCC, with Anderson

(see dinner!)

What common war "scenario" approach? Did

A Johnson invent this?

Monday

8:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m.

McDonald, Pats message to Johnson.

5:15 p.m. end of U.S. (Macmillan)

Established opinion - social expenses of democracy,

size one long

Question of not saying - strike or invasion had been  
considered (as registered):

Why no quantitative analysis? lack of "hard" evidence  
to convince this; - opinion of experts that S.I.  
missiles were unlikely.

Note: Congress reaction - war strike, invasion

(See Taylor, McN. first view?)

Macmillan reply to Connel Bridgeman Monday 6 Monday 8:45 a.m. next

not so much on precedent as on unprecedent condition of

The modern world is a nuclear age.

Not too ready for actual action against Bridgeman

as person on western front of the Free World defense system.

Nov. 2, 1951.

[First ad. Rest - Delayed talk, 22 Oct.]  
- thought,

10:40-11:15 North Anderson

Int. Briefing on nuclear weapon (?)

Tuesday morning

Frank Ball: We've won a considerable victory  
you and I are still here. [Did not believe this?]

[Reinhardt: Same as JFC had said; issue was  
not immediate relevant, but slippery road.]

[Why did SO persist in buying power of nuclear?] [Did not like this "coney" to us?]

Exxon: 10: 3 subcommittees. Berlin, defense planning,  
comm.

Rutge. comm. for inter-allied relationships  
Chair - Col. Korn

Advantages of not letting others play would not be  
likely to tell our hand, & would be free to discuss

Worries

In Riga's case

Plan that Mac would have JFE to use  
against some course of action

(Gordon?)

Tuesday: Memo for JFE (via Gord): Tylor, Talbot & Poston

announce intent for MACRS to Cooper; pointedly

warns JFE to present position as soon as GLE is

available? predictable? Agrees to treat Annex to

obtain from bypassing MACRS to Coop. in ME (but, ME?)

SEE

7 pm Party of interested

Open NCV said 25 war ships enroute to Cuban

this course unchanged [TRUE?]?

in past 24 hrs.

Friday morning 10. Nov.

(1st November (Action?)

Work on similar containing, in E [Plot fewer draft  
of law case]. On this material.  
Does not fit.

disk of Forman & Scali; directly under UN supervision  
Draft by Castro not to accept offensive weapons (?)  
in Cuba; Draft by US not to invade

Scali, Wilson, Rush (that. Brownfield?)

Scali - Form 7:45 : not possible, this short,

Also, papers at UN not by Sov. Union. To submission

[Why?]

Letter begins wing at 6; had been translated  
by US amb in Moscow. [as, not influenced by Scali]

Letter: if comments by Pao, or if flat, would, then will  
simply change anything in either, the question of the  
objection, not w/ of the door to which you call offensive.

With all the variants in mind I would  
best different.

If demands were given by the press and the press,  
of the US that the USG. itself would not participate  
in an attack on China and would restrain others from  
actions of this nature, if you would recall your fleet,  
this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking  
for British forces, but if that were not the case, of  
course, evidently, would declare mobilization and would  
appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor.  
Then, too, the question of ~~expansion~~ to make disappear, since if  
there is no threat, the arms are a burden for many  
people. Then, too, the question of retribution, not only of  
the amounts which you call offensive, but of all the  
amounts as well, would look different.

... it was the first slow station like windom I propose  
we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for

Cuba, will not carry any kind of armament. You must  
realize that the US will not invade Cuba with its  
forces and will not support the any sort of force which  
might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the  
excuse for the presence of our military specialists in  
Cuba would disappear.

Agreement reached at 10 pm to discuss.

Agree to treat as bona fide offer. Drafting an affidavit  
State and US. (Recount of talk, in July,  
though, no explicit offer to remove; suggested Castro's went  
unreached; asked guarantee of Cuban security — difficult  
financially for US)

(Did Nitze, Boston, know?)

as SAC Boston, notifying US immediately (?) or as possible, in writing.

8:15 morning:

Edmon at 10. Discussion draft w/H - [check]  
Kemalite, Radio Moscow letter: you to remove;  
July, inscription.

Thomadze (secretary): U-2 shot down.

U-2 supply. (Our fighters scrambled). Within hours,  
fire on plane. Castro would to shoot down plane

[Soviet system] [check] ?

Urges standard.

[check]: JFK streets on Ridge, Sandy?

Decision by Pres: pick out of each letter best for  
solution agreement.

Edmon at 4: consider proposed options.

Edmon final on Pres. proposal two messages to  
letter sent at 8:05 AM.

See that night, message to Faibisoff and NAC.

Edmon at 9: discussion of additional steps regarding: (1)  
to PRC blockade, notifying US nearest sites; (2) a possible air strike.

UNC

1960-03-07 (15 March 7)

Probable Intel. Warning of war threat in the US

Alternatives, think, so:

warning

conditional induction of one's own statement  
evidence of conditional version

(Would threaten - be nice...  
but, give info that he would  
carry it out? Does he  
expect to?)

Way to get them to do A, which others don't want to do:  
get them to agree to threaten to do A if their party S  
does & a doesn't do Y; gets them to commit w/ first if, i.e.  
either for (A) or for (S) will lead to do Y, i.e., what may be  
higher. "If you don't come up to 20 days early,  
we'll come down."

Thus, reflect the fact that doing A not only hits US  
but also hurts S, whom we wish to influence.

- [The danger of opposition or alarm or frustrations etc., partly on values, emotional reactions to events as they occur, but partly partly on theories as to the "invisible" course of events or the nature of the opponent or the "feasible" alternatives.

(cf: "dangerous theories")

(any use of one nuclear must lead to all-out war between)

(Opposing theories).] [Mobilization → Who? (but not) I wish but don't "decide on who?"]

Possibility of warning: What hypotheses is to possible enemy plans, course of action, goals, values, will evidence be related to? what.

(also problem of observational/reporting uncertainty: given instruments, what is probability that  $X$  has occurred, given a report, our claims, that  $X$  has been observed by means  $A$ ? Then, what is  $p(H_i|X)$ ?

VNC

To interpret SU moves (proposition, etc., threats, incursions, decision to attack — "how likely to, today, and in the days to come")

On, what were will mean?

At other time longer later — things they would have said if prob. of war or attack were high: then try to observe these: a) with high prob. b) with low probability in observation; c) early.

[This "unambiguous" indication can be vulnerable without (2), given (8) + (4).]

To interpret, must have some good info on US-Allied moves that may have triggered (French planes in consider) SU "response." To identify possible "signals" in advance, so as to monitor & suppress, know

1) Our operations, emanations; 2) SU collection sources

3) SU model of our behavior; hypothesis they are testing, and

likelihood functions. Their likelihood function, interpretation of

weights of evidence, might depend on "level of tension."

5. What had K finally told to withdraw IL-28's?

What if quarantine had been lifted earlier?

3c. Note effect of < failure to consult Castro before 28 Oct  
on SU-Cuban relations; + SU later difficulty in  
extricating IL-28's.

DD/I Research Staff: How Minister Cam Venter in Cuba

ORR Cuba 1962: K's misinterpreted back 13 Feb 64

## CRISES

1. Interpretation of motive from choices must take account of all factors in decision theory analysis (at least): utils, pros, (crit rev.).

e.g. SW knew US would see in Cuba; but how much risk of US military action could they accept?

f.e.g. Who did K concern with? (late '61? or mid '60?)

2. How did Sowthern attitude change during study?

What types were rejected? Why? What info was not available earlier? What conclusions were likely then?

3. When did Congress/newspaper reports of missile start (before or after?) / only Sept 1? How synchronized with actual events?

meior

1. Also they may: SA-2's to prevent overflight, protect missiles.

No, except perhaps 1 or 2 SA-2 sites (, East

5. Has SW ever protested against U-2 areas? How much

can be inferred from lack of effort? Failure to proceed with SA-2's is more significant. :)

6. Photos as confirming, establishing validity of info from other sources. [Analyze role of photos as evidence for hypotheticals suggested/generated by other means.]
7. As info: note distinction between comm and electronic emanations. (latter, too, can be 'comm' — as well as 'information.')
8. Background context: SU and to others: nature + scale.  
Bolshevik, Iraq, Egypt
- + timing.
9. Collateral reports of construction, etc. in first half of '62 not supported by photos. What conclusion?
- a) Reports could not be "basis for assuming..."
- b) But were they without basis? (Probably not: perhaps based on known of personnel, not detected by photos)
- c) Did availability of photos, then, "reduce info available to gov"?  
(compared to info available to those without clearances?)

10. Why were missiles transported clandestinely: but not  
concentrated openly?

11. CHART various time-tables.

12. Correlate: US public statement } RAND?

Congress/news assertions

Int. guess, estimates

actual

various kind of evidence

13. Compare McN. intell briefing to Congress.

14. Why switch to supersonic reos of on 5 Sept? Know did  
<sup>(all 14 Nov)</sup>

Cuban/Sovs probably interpret this? (They were aware).

What was attitude/intention of this by US military? Still?

Why reversal on 14 Oct?

- Have they ever been activated, pre-irradiated? Precautions etc.
16. Did 5 SA-2's cover later sites west of Havana?
17. Implications of extreme mobility / flexibility of SA-2 (MIG-21) systems for US planning, influence.
18. How did SC deployment practice in Cuba with SA-2's MIG-21s compare to practice in SC + elsewhere? How does this affect inferences made from SC data?  
(Concreteness; lack of reentrying; field operation...)  
(variation in reentrying; > 1/2 never reentered).

19. Analogy: dependence of an SA-2 site on acquisition by other sites + EW, to raise it from steady condition so it can react fast enough (can't stay in firing condition more than 20-25 minutes); this limits capability for independent action.

(But U-2 is slow enough so individual missile can react; also, does height ~~too~~ increase radius of SA-2 coverage?)

20. Implications as evidence of lack of photo confirmation (e.g. of SA-2 missiles on launcher) when there was no photo coverage.

21. Aug. 5 showed activity at 2 sites but negative on many others (central or those not covered); on Aug 27 (?) many seen already in place. Most of these had had gaps in coverage of 23-61 days. Why?

22. In studying linkage of crises, for some the Bay of Pigs must have been a key element in forming attitudes. What?

23. See Horowitz's graph on no. of plots near after Cuba.

To what does longer attributable delay in maturing the J-3, JCS operations — add the final improvement?

24. Comparison of SA-2 deployment (revealed values) to Neumann study of 1954. What is explanation?

(Question not equivalent to "What was their 'goal'?" Analyze difference.) Note redeployment on "reflection"

— after crisis [IS THIS WHY/WHEN 'REFLECTION' OCCURS?]

25. SAMs in west replaced by first work in Sept.

26. KEY'S 'EVIDENCE':

- ability to <sup>deploy or</sup> operate SAMs earlier, and failure to do so. (like MRBM's)
- a) Ability to delay 128M site construction + MRBM deployment by months; instead of starting 1<sup>st</sup> month before US system activated on 27 Oct.
  - b) Ability to conceal deployment in Cuba (for longer) + failure to try.
    - i. by delaying introduction of unique equipment: tanks, fuel + ordnance trucks.
  - c) Failure of SC to prepare war, <sup>operational</sup> capability to use SAMs to prevent recon. or to defend MRBM's.
  - d) Activation of SAM radars + C+C units on 26-27 Oct: not sooner, and then apparently sooner than planned; Moscow hits on 23-24 Oct. ignoring of Cuban military comm system.
  - e) IRBMs, unusual range of SC threat to US.

27. Note dramatic emergence of SAM radars on 26 Oct +

AO C+C on 27 Oct. (known to whom, in gov? public?)

How interpreted at the time, in US? How long to analyze? How related to ~~Pase, others~~ to shooting of U-2 on 27 Oct? How was latter interpreted by various people at time?

WY

28. What evidence is there that SO considered constraint from  
U-2 flights (as distinct from preventing U-2's, or refusing  
deployment) possible? (ICBM sites particularly hard to cover.  
They may not delay starting them?)

29. List of countries as indicating low prob of US  
response, in SO mind.

(Were they indifferent to nature or timing of US  
non-military response?).

30. SO also ignored Pres warnings on 4 Sept

(NOTE: overflights stopped on 5 Sept, after threat  
of "grave issues" if offensive missiles found).

13 Sept: during interview.

[What were WH-Pres expectations during this  
period? Staff background of these statements?]

31. List of identifiable missile activity at time of 4 + 13 Sept  
statements: so SO could not (did not?) interpret Pres  
statements as based on knowledge + indirectly acceptance.

(13 Sept: first silent of MRBMs apparently Abn, below deck, Wf)]

32. Ambiguity of failure to alert:

a) Hostilities not faced

b) Situation very delicate, fear of effect of  
alert-as-info (bad message), assuming it would be  
seen.

(Failure to carry out actions SC would be seen  
would not be observed, less ambiguous).

c) People in charge of alerting not in on problem.

33. SC protection against ground observation: vs. US, Cuban,  
world public (Cuba strike known off-limits to  
reporters 25 Sept.)

34. SC origin of plan probably not till late '61; final  
commitment to start (?) probably not till April-May '62  
(evidence?). Spetsnaz left beginning of July: decision could have been  
as late as May.

Puchs long preparation in Feb-Mar, perhaps on contingency (or  
exploratory) basis.

35. Report in for '62 that K intended to complete  
production of missiles this year — to resolve Berlin.
36. Analyze how missile move would have  
"strengthened K's bargaining position" over Germany.
37. Relation to SC decision to build up in Indonesia  
(Feb-April '62 decision): possible commitment of  
Sov forces against NATO member (Holland) if conflict  
in West New Guinea. Study?
38. Castro assertion of authority over "old Coms" in  
March-April '62: assumed stable political climate (?)
39. JCS

Compare to US.

39. SC leaders ready to reduce strategy militar (?) imbalance against SC drastically & rapidly. with (4) IRBM sites; so would have been over than 50% increase over end-62 capab.

Q5. How much — and why — would SC have had  
discredited US resolutions, will to resist? (lowered  
US bargaining power). Role of US public  
statements. What could have affected this?

Also: 1) substance  
(in various cases) } of SU military power.  
image: item

2) determined to vs } 50 eyes  
attack on Cuba } in Cuban eye

3) demonstrate support to ally

4) disarmed *Chiono* *cribrum*

4) disarmed *Chiron* *cribrum*

4) disarmed *Chiron citrinum*  
5) of line of retreat, leverage (focus of attention) for removal of US audience bears.

(in case of K's statements in trachea or lungs in Dec 1965  
is creating a problem for him, given our abhorrence to K's  
conduct, leading to this; 1983)

50. SU knew high rate of US ICBM/Polaris activation  
to start in '63, swamp effect of Cuba.  
So, temporary gain.

51. Note K statement on 12 Dec 62: 20% of all aircraft  
of SAC on air alert.

20 Nov - amount of withdrawal of IL-28.  
52. SU option from 22-28 Oct: insure crisis did not escalate  
test US reaction  
of US firm, salvage

53. Response to K-JFK letters: same, 26 Oct letter  
as interpreted in JFK public reply. Did study have access?

54. 31 Oct: SU eager to permit UN inspection of sites.

Laos

Reinhardt [hidden episodes — e.g. of Rice,  
Turkey — can lead to important — but erratic,  
unpredicted, & unknown to others — 'learning' by  
one participant, and to 'maneuvering' by  
them that are concealed from others.]

[How much to allow time of Turkey? CINCO:]

## Questioning

Crisis as an acute, urgent, short process.

(read for lower intensity, recognition

stigmatization; high level search for a solution

a bit - irrelevant

or program; using imagery of current &

currently programmed actions. (The exception is reporting by exception of)

a) the situation - voltage + inadequacy -

measurable? Is there a failure of anticipation?

b) Was a more adequate response attainable

earlier, so that acute, urgent search process

would not have been necessary?

(Contrast with situation when: "We saw the coming; and we know what to do (it still looks best at good enough")

Note how different operational life of "crisis" and

to core situation; however are highly correlated.

Why?

I "Whistfulness" can affect my client or between

frameworks; higher command, actions personnel,

consequences likelihoods

5) Alerting process in different agencies; plans,  
actual, <sup>tentatively</sup>, use, actual execution

6) Transition Phase; the payoff

7) Survey Postcrisis problems

a) effects of leaving left-agencies, public  
    allies in dark

b) effects of ad hoc orgs, bypassing

c) neglect of other problems (Siegwart)

d) role of these effects in setting up a new  
    crisis, dynamic linkage

e) demobilization; budgets

f) political impact: effect on issues  
    image  
    votes

g) new personal relationships with  
    ally, enemies, staffs

(e.g. left out of Lebanon peace  
    Mea in Cuba, etc.)

## Tasks (e.g. Bunting):

- 1) Tablets integrating linkages: instances, and classes, & signatures of couplings between agencies in a crisis: initiatives, segments for info approval, action, warning, statements, comments

Sunny: By passing, slip-shod reporting,  
ad hoc orgs; use of "non-professionals"  
WHY? EFFECTS? FUTURE?

- 2) Alarms linkages

- 3) Event linkages.

- (4,5) Search for "should-have-been" crises: "missed" crises: Hungary, / Cuba Wall; Taiwan of China 1939.
- 6) Search for "might-have-been" crises" - e.g. "incidents" - residents - How/why were they prevented? Are all "real" crises failures? Were they preventable?

- 5) Tablets, surveys: traits, impacts, reasons.

- 6) Tablets uncertainties, doubts: effects (final resolutions).

- 7) Sunny planning within gov; use of checklists, SOP's. OVER

on these little-known crises, or unrelated crises

that may stay? (Also was the crisis that  
failed to be mentioned; like, literature of independence,  
sovereignty, independence).

Questions:

1) Do you feel that crises choices you have  
seen have systematically left out important factors—  
international, left type etc?

2) What are factors likely to seem important to  
top people and be unknown to lower? (under/elite  
e.g. domestic political; themes)

3) How my work output by leaders differ from those  
one would infer from the inputs — like cables,  
int. etc., — and from what international &  
elite?

4) How has your own experience in crises changed your  
views from earlier ones? (or the nature of crises  
inhaler).

5) Your opinion — no crisis worth influence your views of with

Marshall:

Did SAGS feel to plan of "incident"? Was that  
form of the US public reaction being considered  
before taking into action if felt necessary +  
warrantable.

Like the unwilling to release Gordis Report

What would have been the reaction to a shootdown  
(incapacitated, say, by a public pro-democracy of  
flight, reaction of Cuban sovereignty; wouldn't this  
have been in rules of the game?)

## Black Box

Power: All agree but top level sees no  
military going in (some of them) and more going out.  
Cable: Still, do to  
mostly see the one in the wires, not the  
C.I.B. fight - the actions, directions.

What really goes on inside the Box? What  
really worries the President or the Top Staff? What  
do they feel uncertain about, & can about? (And in  
retrospect, were they right to focus on those?)

Why is it important to see within the Black Box

General's problem was how to keep Indians & Egyptians from  
fighting.

Express how to keep funds & talk from fighting.

[ "No one was worried about Jews coming in." ]

Cableman says: "No one - nobody on - believed that  
Savio would do such a thing. There were reasons for calling  
off recon - nobody weather - but none of them would have  
been enough if anyone had thought there was a real chance of  
friendly missiles." This at 8:30 AM 8/20/68  
OVER

Initial visits: Y&N first proposed to get them out  
not earlier than 1<sup>st</sup> Jul. RK <sup>over</sup> talked with out  
TJ Polaris and — ~~and~~ — arrived on scene;  
Is it was a "small act victory" — Jan. (?)

"But — how does Poles get the system  
moving? How does he show he really wants something?  
He wrote the strongest cable I've ever seen, in 1984:  
'I want the ROC Army reduced by 6 divs — not 3  
or 4 or 5 — and I want it in 6 months.'  
Years later, ROC Army reduced by 60,000 men.

"How much of our reaction to this was caused by  
monumental pride at our allies for having the gall to  
carry out that operation without consulting us, privately,  
attempting to conceal & fool us?"

26 March

Nev: JFH's greatest confidante, unless R.C., was Rose; friend since 1933; Rose sister was Kathleen's best friend (Kath killed in plane crash); Kathleen married Rose's adoptive cousin. Rose wants to write memoirs, for fear of impression: what won't die, telling such things to a controller.

Litragency Post-Mortem Study \*

ACDA - Larry Holmes \*

Version of Sandland - McG, RFK

Bus just wouldn't eat anything but pictures.

RFK reaction on seeing pics on 15 Oct:

"I know what those are. Oh, shit!"

McN informed only by "label" it: photos, SI,

"Agent reports 'aren't evidence.' ("just  
opinions, guesses...")

[In camouflage: were nts, i.e. just for protection against  
attack, not photos? i.e. did he assume that  
infrared would be used in photo recon?]

[But then they were wrong. Cuba 1962 "study apparently  
aimed to refute it. Has NCL adjusted  
its assumptions?]

Increasing frustration of intell. analysts, last week  
in Dept.; agents' reports ignored at State, was on  
speculation.

[How do people think, now, "I was wrong."  
e.g. KSR recalls that about Aug 30, at WH,  
he and others reacted to pics of SA-2's: "Aha,  
that's what they're seeing. People who have never  
seen a missile before would think this was a big  
missile..." He assumes now he was wrong; there  
were both. But there weren't; MRBMs did not come in  
till mid-Sept.

Problem of mistaken Reevaluations: Wrong reasons.

24 March

Name:

Agent reporting: none of it is fruit work in Sept reporting  
objects bigger than SA-2's [Even they cannot?] ?

Even more in Sept:

State wouldn't pay attention.

Around 5 Sept: order to USIB to "cease speculation  
on missiles in Cuba." [Why? JFK & RUK just  
didn't want to be bothered by this stuff?]

[Note: last flight 5 Sept: because ~~the~~ SA-2's in?

To avoid "incidents"? Because JFK now  
convinced that only SA-2's were involved? ] [ SAC-81A  
flight? ]

[See McCleary, secret testimony.]

McCone theory conviction, as soon as he heard of SA-2's  
(late August): "Why SA-2's? To shoot something high.  
What's high? U-2's. Why shoot U-2's? To prevent  
observation of something serious. What's serious? MRBMs."

Held to this conviction; if he had been bad, views would  
have had more weight.

~  
Lightning July 25

S4M sites: first activity Aug 5; first units suspended by 11,  
last Oct 16; system activated & open 6-17 Oct.

One unit deployed 26 Oct.

Initial focus: Cuba, suspended Aug 29; reactivated Sept 2.

M59P: No visible activity, Aug 29, Sept 6; reactivation -  
Indicate first visible activity Aug 29 (recognized?)

TR-23: first known alarm - Sept 28.

[No mention of continued activity <sup>as to intentions</sup> Cuba, e.g. in

SO, letter to Paris; informal channels (deception?)

No mention of continuation of activity Cuba to US  
actions (e.g. to air alert) (or in East Germany)

No mention of evidence of US plan of deception to  
US actions.

No element

as to intentions.

Limitations of photos: only 33 MRBM's identified in Cuba before observation of 42 being withdrawn.

Not known whether nosecones & missiles ever mutual at any.

Not known whether any simulated launch exercises involving erection on launcher (could have occurred before first coverage or at night!).

Full reinfo est. would have required 43 missiles.

Possibly ~ 42 IRBM sites (4 under tanks) demand:  
24+16.

Kryvitsky - Stevenson S/Pow; K to Brit. Publ. Roberts 72/Pow,  
said warheads had been removed.

Govt info in Pow. was to assume U.S. that offensive missiles were being withdrawn; statement that warheads not present would not have seemed. (?)

22,000 Pows on 22/Pow: most comm. est.

is AMM equipment to give robust - with cover, not  
over protection of military sites.

Deployment by early '63.

Most in west explored by first week in Sept;  
could have been up. Set no earlier than  
estimated individually or as part-system till 26.10.63

First mines on site about 18.1 ft (earlier 16.8 ft),  
last mine 16.9 ft, on site 19 Oct.

Others: 22, 20 1 ft, 23.8 ft, 6.3 3 ft, 2

If warheads, virtually certain some mines could  
have been removed from one or more sites by  
time sites first identified 14 Oct, and that some  
could have been removed from all 6 by 23 Oct.

No evidence of effort to alert or "heat" any part  
of MRBM force being mines.

[ Study says nothing of attempts to mislead  
Only on intent or actions. ? ]

More than 200 reports of missiles in Cuba prior to  
for '62. Also reports of construction & equipment in  
Spring '62 in areas where SAM sites located later; but  
photos failed to reveal.

But, reports may have reflected low precision radar  
planning, preparation  
associated with buildup that began by <sup>late</sup> ~~early~~  
a late July. Present my less general report.  
(wrong) of extent

[ Finding? for preparatory actions to lead to  
reports that will be disproved, discredit later,  
true reports. ]

[ Agents my report inferences, conclusions, as facts. ]

No previous indication, but low and does bring  
to start action from 22 Oct, or that subsequently  
the wire placed in position suggesting hostilities were  
imminent.

In late '61, pub. during & after 22nd Party Congress.  
It, pub. rephrased in light of Vietnam in Jan '61,  
Sino-North in August [Egg of Pigs? Sartorial?],  
resolution of myth of low SCM priority in Oct.,  
military econ trouble, controversy with Choson.

Intention to establish a military base in China probably  
had origins in policy deliberations of that time; but  
consistent pub. at that spring.

I may have felt that it indicated "rule of the  
gun"—that bases on armaments purely are facts of  
great power life, not provocation to war.

[+ no asymmetry.]

Assembly of Il-28's went on slowly but steadily  
all night - Pov.

Although ~~was~~<sup>not</sup> aware of it now at least by  
mid '62, nor so often, they didn't need to complete  
AS system or parts. Probably goal date of first half of Nov;  
not intended to screen building.

Arrived units addressed between first week in Sept.  
- mid-Oct. until till either by mid-Sept.

Suggestion that Sov leaders regarded risks as low.  
Could have — but didn't — then wished as significantly  
situation in which defense screened offensive weapons  
or minimize this between. First identifiable 4x2M sites +  
SP readiness of whole system.

Ignored possibility of US overflights. Since  
inevitable (?) unless Sov leaders (?) judged confidently  
that US would agree, or not react militarily — so (?)  
poss. of US detection was not critical to success or failure.

One cruise missile unit deployed operationally, from  
initial location, about 25 or 26 Oct.,  
<sup>on west</sup>

one armored group moved out of except at  
same time.

27 Oct. V-2 shot down, probably by SA missile.

(cause can't be determined)

at all or virtually all 416-21 continued toward  
it some airfield gulls assembled; no unusually high level  
of activity, most high and till first hit on Nov.

No discernible activity at 3 of 4 ground force  
encounters, where armored groups remained highly  
vulnerable to attack. Some boats also inactive.

By 1 Nov. seas had begun. diminishing.

Some indications of deliberate effort by seas to desert  
as plainly as possible that missiles & boats were given  
(No attempt to return; 188 Mots demolished; cooperated in  
pulling back tanks at sea when challenged).

22-23 Oct

in Cuba

One action taken to upgrade combat readiness, but most of this not till several days after Pops speech, and then appear to have been earlier than intended; all other elements of Inv forces showed little, so stage is static.

? indecision & confusion?

\* Most important action [in Cuba] was establishment  
on 23-24 Oct of two direct command comms. links between  
Moscow + Cdr. (presumed? no scratcher duration till  
28 Oct).

\* AD system operational 27 Oct; however? expanded  
steadily after.

At sites, construction continued; some training?

Vehicles + equipment dispersed + camouflaged; AAA positions  
+ tanks present. May have been occasioned by rush by  
low-level recon starting 23 Oct as by Pops speech, for  
low-level mission must have informed invs at the sites  
with the design of attack.